Edge Device Intrusion
Clean Integrity Check, Compromised Appliance: Chained Ivanti Zero-Days Left Almost Nothing on Disk to Find
Volexity published its analysis on October 13 of a chain against Ivanti Connect Secure that produces unauthenticated root-level command execution. CVE-2026-104935 covers an authentication bypass — a request to the public welcome.cgi naming a protected script in the X-DSCGI-PATH header reaches it without credentials — together with a race-condition file write in wu.cgi, where an upload lands on disk before validation and is executed in the window before deletion. A third flaw, privilege escalation through the dsinvoked broker trusting DSCache configuration data, has no CVE and no fix yet. Exploitation began October 3 against a fully patched appliance; Ivanti patched on October 13, the day CISA added the CVE to KEV. Volexity attributes the activity to a previously unknown actor, UTA0576.
No web shell, backdoor or first-stage binary was deployed: commands and their output travelled inside the exploit's own HTTPS requests. The payload truncates /home/runtime/dlogs/debuglog and /var/log/audit/audit.log across the targeted window, deletes its own scripts, restores the modified DSCache entry and keeps the library patch in memory only, so Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool reports no modification at all. Forensic priority: treat a clean integrity check as no evidence. Memory acquisition from the live appliance recovered the operator tooling, output and packet captures; look for /data/.icscap/ holding cap* files and a renamed tcpdump running as dsstatmond, and web logs where the request path and the X-DSCGI-PATH header disagree. Post-exploitation took LDAP credentials, LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys, so scope the domain, not the box.